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9Visit of Vilhelm II to Turkey caused a lot of disturbance mainly in the 
Russian Court. Alexander III arrived in 
Berlin in October 11-13, 1889. During 
the long conversation with Bismark 
the Tsar showed his interest in the visit 
of Vilhelm II to Constantinople and 
wanted to fi nd out whether Turkey was 
really eager to join the Triple Alliance. 
Bismark dispelled Tsar’s doubts 
putting down Vilhelm’s visit to only 
interests of youth. Because of Bismark 
he decided to visit Constantinople 
and then go back to his motherland, 
as to reach Athens and not to see 
Constantinople seemed unreasonable 
to him. The Chancellor assured the 
Tsar that Germany did not have any 
political interests in Turkey1. Actually, 
visit of Vilhelm II to Constantinople 
had serious political and economic 
aims, as the construction of the railway 
chain was arranged2. Using it Germany 
was going to reach political and 
economic domination over Asia Minor. 
Therefore, in 1890 a German-Turkish 
commercial agreement was signed and 
as a result Germany got control over the 
Turkish customs3. The most remarkable 
thing was that still in December 1890, 
when the above mentioned agreement 
was being discussed at Raikhstag, 
Simens had a special speech. The head 
of German bank announced that times 
when the German production in Turkey 
remained in shadow because of English 
and French entrepreneurs’ policy were 
over. He added that it was time to act 
independently in that country. At the 
end, representing the German policy 
towards Ottoman Turkey, Simens 
announced that they are interested only 
in setting up new customs offi ces at the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles4.
So, it seemed like the colonial 
policy of Kaiser Germany towards 
Ottoman Turkey was growing, and the 
main factors of the process were the 
purchase of concessions connected 
with Berlin-Bagհdad from Turkey in 
1888, the visit of Vilhelm II to Ottoman 
Turkey, German-Turkish commercial 
agreement etc.
Thus, getting large economic 
prevalence over Turkey Kaiser 
Germany was aspiring to transfer it 
into politics and achieve political 
dominance as well. And the Sultan, 
taking into consideration the hard 
international position of Turkey, and 
trying to get Germany’s support in 
the sphere of international diplomacy, 
started to satisfy Germany’s ambitions 
and inclinations in building of the 
railway without noting that this would 
make Turkey’s international diplomacy 
more complicated and would cause 
breakdown of Turkey.
In 1891 the representative of 
“German Bank” Kaulla, arrived to 
Constantinople. He was to negotiate 
with Sultan on matters of stretching 
the railway up to Baghdad. Following 
the advice of the Ambassador of 
Germany in Constantinople, Kaulla 
offered Sultan fi rst to explore the route 
of the future railway and afterwards 
to allocate lands for its construction. 
Abdul Hamid II agreed and promised 
to support the project fi nancially, as 
well as organizationally5. But fi nancial 
diffi culties and the skepticism in Turkish 
promises made Germany temporarily 
delay the construction of the railway 
and keep cautious policy especially 
towards the railway being built in 
Persian Gulf and Baghdad territory. 
Receiving the report from Kaulla 
about the fi nancial situation of Turkey, 
Simens held a conference in Berlin in 
May, 1892, where it was decided that 
it would be more convenient to get 
concessions for the construction of 
Ankara-Kaisir railway before starting 
the construction of the way up to 
Baghdad, and to build Eskishekhir-
Konia part in the South6. The results 
of the conference were immediately 
transferred to the Ministry of Foreign 
1  Die Grosse Politik Europeische Kabinete 1871-1914. Sammlung«der diplomatischen Akten des auswärtigen Amtes», Berlin 1922, B. 6, 
dok №1358.
2  Die Grosse Politik Europeische Kabinete 1871-1914. Sammlung«der diplomatischen Akten des auswärtigen Amtes», Berlin 1922, B. 6, 
dok №1358.
3  E. Reventlov, Von Potsdam nach Doorn, Berlin 1940, S. 298.
4 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reiches, Berlin 1890,B.2, S.888-889.
5  «Die Grosse Politik Europeische Kabinete 1871-1914. Sammlung«der diplomatischen Akten des auswärtigen Amtes», Berlin 1923, B. 
14, dok 3961.
6 Helfferich K., Georg von Siemens, B.3, Berlin 1923, p. 62.
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Affairs and Germany betook the special 
policy for getting concessions to build 
Eskishekhir-Konia railway. It is worth 
mentioning that German bank took into 
consideration also those ways which 
had important military function, and the 
railways were especially constructed 
in those directions. From this point, 
the concession regarding Saloniki-
Monastir which was gained in 1890, 
was very important7. And the province 
of Konia was signifi cant for its riches, 
where not only German entrepreneurs 
acting in the territory of Turkey, but 
also English and French entrepreneurs 
were eager to have industrial centers. 
That was the reason why the above 
mentioned organizations were trying 
to fail Germans’ attempts and fi rmly 
resisted German bank penetrations. 
For this reason Kambon, the French 
Ambassador in Constantinople was 
trying to gain concessions for the 
construction of Smirna-Kassabu 
railway, which was the main part of 
Eskishehir-Konia railway. In 1892, 
he reminded Sultan that not giving 
concessions for the construction of 
the above mentioned railway will be 
considered as “an irreverent treatment 
towards France”8. Nevertheless, 
Sultan refused that demand under the 
reassurances of Germany9. 
Little by little, the situation between 
Turkey and English and French ambitions 
was getting anxious. They were trying to 
prevent Germany’s active foreign policy 
in Turkey. This time English Ambassador 
Ford had a speech in Constantinople. 
On January 5, 1893 he told Sultan that 
his government was strictly against the 
decision to devolve the construction of 
Eskishehir-Konia railway to Germany10. 
He assured that it was a destroying 
blow to the interests of Great Britain. 
This menace was accompanied by the 
activation of naval forces of England.
The Russian Ambassador was also 
against the above mentioned decision, 
emphasizing that the fund of Konia 
was the main mechanism to cover the 
debt of Turkey towards Russia, though 
they cannot let Germany control those 
territories. The German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs rebutted under the 
pressure of “German Bank”, and as 
a result on January 7, 1893, Marshal, 
the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
informed the ambassador of Germany 
in London that he was going to 
annul the announcement of English 
ambassador, directly meant to attack 
Germany, which would exacerbate 
the interrelations of Germany and 
England11.
To inhibit the English pressure on 
Germany and to enlarge the German 
plan of construction of the railway in 
Ottoman Turkey, Kaiser Germany used 
the Egyptian issue. In many problems 
connected with Egypt, Germany had 
always been on the English side, bearing 
in mind that this way the relations 
between England and Germany may 
be exacerbated. For this purpose, after 
Ford’s speech, on January 6, 1893, 
Germany gave the contrary opinion on 
the problem to which he had given a 
positive reply before. This was about 
the intension of England to increase 
its armed forces in Egypt. This time, 
the English side longed for the support 
of Germany, as Russia and France 
were against its objectives. For this 
reason English Ambassador in Cairo 
immediately sent a telegram to the 
Prime Minister Rozbery asking him 
to solve the problems with Germany 
connected with Turkey, in order to 
reacquire Germany’s support for his 
plans in Egypt12. London authorities 
changed their previous policy towards 
Germany. Rozbery announced that he 
himself did not have anything against 
Germany’s economic activities in 
Turkey. Negotiations between German 
Ambassador Radolin and English 
Ambassador Ford, which took place 
in Constantinople, settled the small 
but very important problem. This was 
gainful for both of them13.
However German diplomacy was 
not only struggling to overcome English 
obstacles, it was also against English-
Turkey confi dential negotiations. 
Ambassador Radolin told about it in 
details in his notes written between 
December 23, 1892 and January 9, 
1893. Just since his fi rst letter Radolin 
has presented the actions and structure 
of Ottoman government, as well as 
using German methods of diplomacy 
in Turkey14. From these letters one can 
notice that Sultan was negotiating with 
Kaula and Radolin about concessions 
without Turkish Great Vezir Kyamil 
pasha (the English were trying to fail 
German plans with the help of vizier). 
That’s why when the negotiations have 
already successfully fi nished, they 
met a strong opposition from Kyamal 
pasha, because the Great Vizier was 
not aware of lots of issues which 
were considered to have been already 
solved. Radolin realized this very well 
and he informed the Embassy staff 
about Sultan’s independent actions, 
due to which Sultan had always had 
confi dential and private negotiations, 
meanwhile introducing his actions 
as acts of representatives of Turkish 
Diplomatic Institutions.
In the note dated January 9, 1893 
Radolin explained in details the last 
stage of providing concessions. He 
emphasized that not only England, 
France and Russia were against the 
German plans but also “the Turkish 
society, which was displeased with the 
fact that Sultan was giving everything 
to Germany”15. The Great Vizier who 
had a great reputation, following the 
advice of the English, introduced a 
special batch of documents, revealing 
all the counterfeits of Germany, the 
colonial policy of Germany in Turkey, 
and exhorted Abdul Hamid II not to 
7 Ibid, p. 49-50; See alsoA. Cheradame, La question d Orient La Macedonie, Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,Paris 1903, p. 19-20.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid.
10  «Die Grosse Politik Europeische Kabinete 1871-1914. Sammlung«der diplomatischen Akten des auswärtigen Amtes», Berlin 1923, B. 
14, dok № 3965.
11  Ibid, dok № 3966.
12 Ibid, dok № 3967.
13  Ibid, dok № 3969, № 3970, № 3971, № 3972, № 3973.
14  Ibid, dok № 3963.
15  Ibid, dok № 3970.
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provide concessions to the Germans. 
Vizier was trying to persuade that all 
the fi nancial investments of Germany 
had thrown Turkey into temptation 
and confusion. A special committee 
in which the Great Vizier, lawyers 
and public fi gures were included 
was organized for the consideration 
of documents produced by Kyamil. 
While the committee was making 
a decision, Sultan decided to stop 
providing concessions to Germany 
and informed Radolin about it asking 
him to wait a little bit16. The latter 
switched to real actions and on January 
7, 1893 and getting instructions from 
Berlin, started new activities. Radolin 
informed Abdul Hamid II about the 
Kaizer’s solicitude related to the fact 
that Kaizer had believed Sultan’s 
promises and had always thought, that 
fi nally Sultan would bring into life the 
plan which had so vital importance 
for both countries. And the German 
Ambassador added that Sultan will get 
rid of diffi culties as soon as he makes a 
positive decision. On January 9, Rajib 
bey visited Radolin and informed him 
that after the long conversation with 
Sultan, the latter had called the Great 
Vizier and ordered him to quicken the 
process of providing concessions to 
Germany17. 
Thus, German-Turkish relations 
were brought to practice. Getting the 
construction of the important Berlin-
Baghdad railway, Turkey and Germany 
got fi rmly economically connected. 
Germany not only protected Turkey but 
also represented itself as the confederate 
of Turkey, so that each procedure would 
be exercised based on legal point of view. 
Germany also tried to make plans of the 
Great Powers to separate the Turkish 
territory perish and positioned itself as 
the protector of Turkey.
In the late 90s of XIX century 
Germany already had rather fi rm 
basis in Turkey. Ottoman Turkey’s 
role and signifi cance was growing up 
for Germany. That’s why the political 
mission of Germany in Turkey was 
strengthened. In autumn 1897 Marshal 
Fon Biebershteine, the German Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs, was 
appointed the Ambassador of Germany 
in Constantinople18. During his 
mission Marshal did everything for his 
good prestige and surprised Ottoman 
governing circles with his cunning.
Yet on March 5, 1898 in his fi rst 
letter directed to Reich chancellor 
Hohenloeine, Marshal fi rst glorifi ed the 
Eastern policy of Vilhelm II, and then 
presented all the means and directions 
which would promote the German 
fund investments. He was assuring that 
they must use all the possible means 
to entirely involve Turkey into their 
plans. Marshal was excluding even the 
smallest rebates to their opponents. He 
mentioned in his letter that Germany 
might be rigor in each part of Turkey 
in order not to let it be available for 
anyone else. He believed that Berlin-
Baghdad railway with all its sectors 
must be constructed by Germans. Due 
to it they would domain the valleys 
of Euphrates and Tigris, as well as 
the Persian Gulf. At the end Marshal 
especially mentioned that they had 
to be sure that no one would surpass 
Germany in that territory19.
Special activities were organized 
by political circles. German fi nancial 
investments in Turkey were increased, 
and yielding to Marshal’s reassurances 
the quantity of German military forces 
was also increased. He attained his 
goal and a special military delegation 
arrived in Turkey. These people prepared 
many Turkish offi cers and sent them 
to Germany to be trained and deepen 
their knowledge. These measures could 
increase the role of Germany in Turkey.
In his report dated March 5, 1898 
Marshal wrote about the results reached 
by the delegation led by Fon der Holts, 
showed the strengthening position of 
Germany in Turkey and assured that 
if they could send one more general to 
Turkey endowed with Holts’s talent, 
the German policy in Turkey could be 
considered to be fully successful20. In 
May 1898, Marshal informed the offi cials 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
he had persuaded the Sultan to order 
250 000 rifl es in German factories. 
Besides, the Sultan had agreed to order 
by his own means 200 million bullets 
instead of 100 million, which came to 25 
million marks21. Thus, due to Marshal’s 
policy German ammunition producing 
factories, named “Mauser”, “Lyove” etc, 
got great profi ts in a very short time.
In the fi rst half of 1898 due to 
cooperation between Marshal and 
Morgan one more group of Turkish 
offi cers was sent to Germany22. In the 
telegram Marshal was explaining the 
advantages and the useful points of his 
own diplomacy for Germany. From his 
point of view, it was very important 
to make the Turks believe that the 
strengthening German psychology in 
the Turkish army was fi rst of all within 
the scopes of interest of Turkey itself. 
Though, he was mentioning, that they 
must not show the interest of  Germany 
in it all that. “Nevertheless, the Turks 
must be sure that Germany is the offering 
party and Turkey is the consumer”23.
 In his letter dated April 9, 1898, 
Marshal demanded Reich Chancellor 
Hohenloeine to keep more active foreign 
policy and to get the construction of 
the railway up to Baghdad start. He 
thought that the whole Middle East 
would be connected to Germany after 
that, and that they would be able to 
use those achievements for their own 
interests. Marshal was exhorting all the 
German entrepreneurs and companies 
to quicken the activities connected with 
the construction of the railway. He 
believed that they should act quickly 
and invest as much as possible, as other 
interested countries were managing 
a sly diplomacy trying to persuade 
the Sultan to give them concessions. 
16 Kemal Bey Ismail, The Memois, London 1920, p. 241-243.
17  «Die Grosse Politik Europeische Kabinete 1871-1914. Sammlung «der diplomatischen Akten des auswärtigen Amtes», Berlin 1924, 
B. 14, dok № 3970.
18  Б. Бюлов, Воспоминания, Москва 1935, с. 132.
19 Ibid, dok № 3339..
20  Ibid, dok № 3339.
21  Ibid, dok № 3340.
22  Ibid, dok № 3341.
23 Ibid.
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But making big fi nancial investments 
Germany would solve these problems 
at once. Besides, Marshal offered to 
make arrangements for economical 
adoption of the Euphrates and Tigris 
and for organizing the navigation 
in these two rivers. In this message 
Marshal introduced the contracts with 
the Anatolian major engineer Cander 
which led to lengthening of the railway 
to Baghdad24.
After conversation with Marshal 
Cander arrived in Berlin and leaning 
upon Morgan’s information about 
Vilhelm II, being very much interested 
in building, the railway network, 
he with Simens offered to involve 
”Zeehandlung” (a Prussian fi nancial 
company that was very much interested 
in the matter) in building the railroad 
system. But then there was a confl ict 
connected with Cander’s acting of 
his own, which made the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs B. Bryulov angry. He 
believed that everything happened 
because of self-willingness of Marshal, 
who hadn’t informed Berlin about it. 
But Bryulov gave in, as the problem 
was connected with Germany’s 
foreign interests. He didn’t turn down 
“Zeehandlung”, but German Bank was 
given the right to control that company. 
At the same time Bryulov gave special 
instructions to Marshal and demanded 
to support Cander and the German 
Bank25.
Morgan, the Military Attaché and 
Consultant of German troops in Turkey 
began his activities in Constantinople. 
In one of his reports Morgan described 
the state of Turkish military forces and 
especially pointed out the readiness 
of Turkish troops in those parts of 
Channels. The Military Attaché 
paid special attention to the fact that 
Turkey had reinforced the control over 
Bosporus and Dardanelles, which was 
especially directed against the Great 
Powers. All that let Morgan act from 
positions of active policy in Near East 
and announce the following: ‘’We have 
all the reasons to insist on the necessity 
to keep the completeness of Ottoman 
Turkey providing us with huge economic 
achievements, and in future it will 
provide military reinforcement as well. 
That’s why we should enlarge military 
fortifi cations. Only experienced German 
offi cers can support Sultan in it; with 
their help we can keep our achievements, 
and undertake new ones’’26.
This dispatch gave birth to protest 
of German diplomat Rihtgofen, who 
was temporarily leading the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Rihtgofen informed 
Bryulov about it and noted that Morgan’s 
varied activity in Constantinople 
caused outrage of the Great Powers and 
particularly Russia. It certainly had bad 
infl uence on Russia-Germany relations. 
Rihtgofen thought that militarization 
of Turkey will be certainly noticed 
by other countries, and it would lead 
to worsening of relations between all 
sides. Rihtgofen’s worries didn’t last 
long as Wilhelm II considered them 
impracticable and exhorted Morgan to 
be calm27. But it didn’t limit Morgan’s 
activity in Constantinople. After the 
offi cial visit of Wilhelm II Morgan 
undertook more active diplomatic and 
military activity. 
Thus, Eastern policy of Kaiser 
Germany in the Middle East represented 
by Ottoman Turkey, had a stable basis. 
Ottoman Turkey was connected with 
Kaiser Germany through military, 
economic and fi nancial ties. There 
were all suitable conditions for colonial 
policy in the Middle East. For that 
purpose the offi cial visit of Wilhelm II 
to Ottoman Empire was organized and 
fulfi lled.
The most important step to conquer 
Asia Minor was taken in 1888, when 
the agreement between ‘’German 
Bank’’ and Ottoman Turkey related to 
the construction of Berlin-Bagհdad 
railroad system was reached. After the 
railroad was built the position of Kaiser 
Germany in the Middle East became 
stronger. Cooperation between Germany 
and Turkey in the political, military and 
economic fi elds became more practical.
The fi rst visit of Wilhelm II to 
Constantinople laid the foundation 
for new era in the relations between 
Germany and Turkey.
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